A challenge on intrinsic values

In expansion to my point earlier about life having no intrinsic value, but rather value existing as a construct utilizing a criteria, I would like to expand in regards to a couple of points/examples. Primarily, the benefits of having such a view.

So, to reiterate my point, I argued that lives are given value by others (who collectively form
"society", a big theme in this argument and what I would say is the ultimate expression of our moral conjecturing), under criteria, namely exmaning in what way they serve others. Obviously, humans are naturally self-serving (as is expected vzv the 'survival instinct'), and if we were to hold each of ourselves as the ultimate moral comparitive the only way our logic would hold any universal weight is if we accept Hobbes' argument of society as the collective of mutual self-servitude, an existentialist tendency which leads to ourselves as the highest power (in our minds), leading to uncertainty and questionable practices. Instead, if we slightly modify this as to acknowledge that while we are self-serving, society is instead here regarded as an entity of itself (rather than a modus operandi), which we serve (for the same means - our own survival and prosperity - this being a point few would challenge).

Let us then look at the way in which we serve society, particularly our value as individual members. While one might argue that we are all living beings, and that entitles us to certain 'inalienable rights', let us examine the suggestion that our value is defined by society (and, by extension, others - specifically, not ourselves) in an example of moral ambiguity:

I was reading an article today on the dwindling population of Mountain Gorillas, 380 of which (roughly 60% of the global population) live in Congo, Africa. Remains of a mother and her infant surfaced, having been killed by poachers, in the wake of the death of a silverback of a family of six. Now, to me, it seems that by placing any value on anything (a practice which I do advocate), we are obligated to act in accordance with our values (also placing value on our values), morally contracting us to construct and hold certain tenets of conduct. I think that very few people could then justify non-action in the face of extinction of species of such high intelligence (or, technically, any species - of course this introduces the necessity of hypocrisy...but let's pretend I didn't bring that up). Now, I would argue that public torture and execution of the perpetrators would be justified for at least two reasons:

One, it would serve as a deterrent, ensuring the continuation of the greater good and displays an exercise of action on our behalf.

Two, I would argue that certain actions invalidate one's claim to their lives having value. Under the intrinsic argument, one could not argue for action taken against even the most evil of persons because of the relativist stance one places themselves in when they say everyone has an equal value. Under their argument, taking action and altering their life in any way is completely unjustified because they are vested with no authority to do such an act. One life is equal to another, no man-made criteria can change that, they argue. And, as I gleefully point out, in the face of this presentation, most people will augment their position to something along the lines of "Well, we must make these arbitrary concessions [as to value, morals, whatever] for the progenitation and continuation of the good (essentially so the world doesn't go to hell through inaction)." To this, I smile and pick up my point:

In order to preserve a society that is livable, albeit not universally 'just' - this being irrelevant - we must create arbitary values and enforce them as if they were universal.

This is the primary tenet for self-adjustment of morals, which gives me the justification for saying that we create, not observe, the value of life in regards to certain criteria - "for the betterment of the greater good", I would argue, is justification. Taking this back to the case of the poachers, these men have crossed a potential threshold of moral sanctity and the value of their lives has taken a drastic alteration. At this point, their grisly deaths would serve as a strong deterrent for others who would break this obligation we have towards upholding the survival of endangered animal populations.

Now, there is hazy ground, and I feel dissatified at the way I have presented my point because it is quite easy from here to question our obligation to animals (for a plethora of reasons I will not go into), but on a pragmatic note (and by no means as a valid step of logic) I would ask "who of you does not feel obligated to protect this endangered species?

In conclusion, I have made two points. One, that values of life are constantly being adjusted in accordance in regards to society (which I have not fully expanded on yet - will come later), and that appropriating an "inherent" value to life necessitates non-action; in order to actively shape our world based on any set of moral code (even holding a moral code, I would argue) necessitates an "universally arbitrary" set of values that we must hold as "true" within our own universe. Otherwise, we shall be subject to the various whims and wills of others, hoping that one day everyone will come to see life as we do, stone kings upon our throne prisons in a sociopathic court.

Hope everyone's summer is going well. =D